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The theory of games provides a mathematical formalization of strategic choices, which have been
studied in both economics and neuroscience, and more recently has become the focus of
neuroeconomics experiments with human and non-human actors. This paper reviews the results
from a number of game experiments that establish a unitary system for forming subjective expected
utility maps in the brain, and acting on these maps to produce choices. Social situations require the
brain to build an understanding of the other person using neuronal mechanisms that share affective
and intentional mental states. These systems allow subjects to better predict other players’ choices,
and allow them to modify their subjective utility maps to value pro-social strategies. New results for a
trust game are presented, which show that the trust relationship includes systems common to both
trusting and trustworthy behaviour, but they also show that the relative temporal positions ofﬁrst and
second players require computations unique to that role.
Keywords: neuroeconomics; game theory; trust; reward; social;
functional magnetic resonance imaging; oxytocin
1. INTRODUCTION
Neuroeconomics brings together research in neuro-
science and economics to better understand how
actors make decisions by unifying mathematical con-
structs with behavioural measurements (McCabe 2002;
Glimcher & Rustichini 2004; Camerer et al.2 0 0 5 ).
Neuroeconomics research includes the study of social
decision making or how actors make decisions when
other actors are affected by the outcome, and/or other
actors are also making decisions, and uses techniques
such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
positron emission topography (PET), transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) and pharmacological interven-
tions. Game theory, formalized by von Neuman &
Morgenstern (1944), has been very useful in helping to
formulate experiments, and to interpret the decisions
that actors make, and the neural signatures of these
decisions in the brain. In studying decisions in an
experiment, neuroeconomists are interested in recover-
ing the neural computations/algorithm that subjects use
tochooseactionsthatultimatelyresultinoutcomes.One
of the goals of neuroeconomics is to provide a consistent
biologically based connection between our functional
and computational understanding of strategic choice.
Games can be analysed in different ways based on
ways that strategies end up being chosen. Strategies may
have evolved based on their ﬁtness in the game ecology;
theymaybelearntthroughrepeatedinteractions,or they
may be deduced from the logic of the game. Each of
these approaches is likely to involve a differential
emphasis on the computations performed by a unitary
neural system instantiated in the brain. For example,
evolved strategies are likely to be driven more by
pathways from sensory systems to expected utility
maps and onto response systems, learned strategies will
add a reinforcement learning strategy over both the
probability that an event will occur and the contingent
action that produces the highest expected reward, while
deduced strategies are likely to involve more symbolic or
abstract encodings and simulations of other people and
willrequireevaluativeattentiontointermediateresultsin
serial, what-if, computations. The human brain is likely
tohave evolved a functional capacity to choose strategies
using neural systems operating at all three levels.
In this paper, we ﬁrst brieﬂy summarize the
description and interpretation of neuroeconomics
games under game theoretic aspects including experi-
mental designs for the measurement and control of
expected utility. Then, we describe experiments
investigating primate behaviour in games against a
computer and with other primates, before we review
the literature on human economic game playing and its
neural correlates. Finally, we present new fMRI
ﬁndings regarding brain regions particularly involved
in trust and reciprocity during economic exchange.
(a) Describing and interpreting
neuroeconomics games
The games that have been the focus of study so far by
neuroeconomics are all two-actor games that are either
competitive games, such as matching pennies game
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tion game (ISG), or cooperative games, such as
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG), equal split game
(ESG), ultimatum game (UG), dictator game (DG),
investment game (IG) and trust game (TG). In the
following, we look at both how these games are formally
deﬁned and how game theory analyses these games.
The MPG, RSPG, ISG and PDG in ﬁgure 1 are
presented as strategic form games; each player has to
simultaneously make a choice from a set of choices.
In particular, player 1 must choose a row from the set
S1Z{r
1, ., r
n}, where n is the number of rows in the
matrix. Call this choice player 1’s strategy or denote it
s12S1. At the same time, player 2 must choose a
column from the set S2Z{c
1, ., c
m}, where m is the
number of columns in the matrix. Call this choice
player 2’s strategy or denote it s22S2. The pair of
strategies (s1, s2) is called a pure strategy proﬁle.
Strategy proﬁles determine a pay-off or utility for
each player, denoted U1(s1, s2) and U2(s1, s2). For
example, in the PDG (ﬁgure 1d), the rows and
columns have been labelled cooperate and defect and
the pay-offs are displayed in the matrix so that U1
(cooperate, defect)Z0 and U2 (cooperate, defect)Z3.
Instrictly competitive games,also known aszero-sum
games, each outcome has the property that the sum of
pay-offsiszero.Theonlyoptionsaretodraw(0,0)orfor
one player to win and the other to lose (x, Kx).
Examples of strictly competitive games include the
MPG (ﬁgure 1a) and RSPG (ﬁgure 1b). In the MPG,
row and column players simultaneously choose heads
(H) or tails (T). If they match, the row player wins (C1)
and the column player loses (K1). If they do not match,
the row player loses and the column player wins. The
RSPG is similar except now players simultaneously
choose rock (R),scissors (S) or paper(P). Iftheychoose
the same, they tie (0), but otherwise rock wins over
scissors, scissors wins over paper and paper wins
over rock. Optimal strategies involve randomization (or
unanticipated play) resulting in uncertainty as to who
will actually win. We assume that nature will favour
players who can ﬁnd any inherent advantage in these
games, and therefore the brains of these players will be
designed to ﬁnd and exploit these advantages. One well-
known system for exploiting advantages is through
reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto 1998).
In the ISG, the row player (acting as an employee)
must decide whether to work (W) or shirk (S)
(ﬁgure 1c). If the employee works, he gains 1 no matter
what. But work is costly to the employee, who prefers to
shirk and gain 2, unless the employee gets caught by the
boss and gets 0. The column player, acting as the boss,
must decide to inspect (I), the only way to detect
shirking, or the boss could choose not to inspect (DI).
The cost of inspection is KC. If the boss inspects (I)
when the employee works, the boss gains 2KC, but if
the boss inspects when the employee shirks the boss
loses KC. However, if the boss fails to inspect (DI)
when the employee shirks, the boss loses K2, but if the
boss chooses not to inspect and the employee works,
the boss gains 2. As in the strictly competitive games
above, the optimal strategies for the employee and the
boss will involve randomization.
In the PDG, two players must simultaneously decide
to either cooperate or defect (Axelrod 1984; ﬁgure 1d).
If they both cooperate, they do better, with a pay-off
(2, 2) compared with (1, 1) when they both defect.
However, each player’s optimal strategy is to always
defect and get 3 if the other player cooperates and avoid
getting 0 if the other player defects.
The ESG, UG, DG, IG and TG in ﬁgure 2 are
presented as extensive form games; each player has to
sequentially make a choice at each of the decision nodes,
n
i, assigned to that player. The strategy sets, S1 and S2,
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Figure 1. Matrix games: (a) matching pennies game (MPG: H, head; T, tail), (b) rock–scissor–paper game (RSPG: R, rock; S,
scissor; P, paper), (c) inspection game (ISG: W, work; S, shirk; I, inspect; DI, do not inspect; C, cost of inspection), and
(d) Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG: C, cooperate; D, defect). P1, player 1; P2, player 2.
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that a player can make. It is still reasonable to think of
the strategy proﬁle (s1, s2) as being chosen simul-
taneously, but in making these choices players will take
into account the sequential order of the moves. In an
extensive form game, a strategy proﬁle picks a path
from an initial decision node through the game tree to a
terminal node {t
1, ., t
k}, where k is the number of
different outcomes in the game. Similar to the strategic
form games, players have preferences over the out-
comes in the extensive form games, or equivalently over
the strategy proﬁles that produce these outcomes.
In the ESG, player 1 is assigned to the decision node
n1 and player 2 to the decision nodes n2 and n3
(ﬁgure 2a). Player 1 decides whether to offer player 2
an equal split of ($5, $5) or an unequal split of ($8, $2).
Player 2 must then decide whether to accept or reject
the offer. A play through the game tree is a connected
path of branches through the decision nodes that end at
one of the terminal (or outcome) nodes labelled as t
1
through t
4, with a resulting pay-off to player 1 of U1(t
i)
and to player 2 of U2(t
i) for reaching the terminal node
t
i. For example, in the ESG, the choice of the branch
labelled R (reject) by player 1 and the branch labelled
A (accept) by player 2 results in the terminal node t
4
and the pay-offs U1(t
4)Z8 and U2(t
4)Z2.
In the UG, player 1 must propose how to divide a
ﬁxed amount of money, say $10 (Gu ¨th et al. 1982;
ﬁgure 2b). Once player 1 proposes, player 2 can either
accept or reject. If player 2 rejects the proposal, both
players earn zero; otherwise, the players earn the split
proposed by player 1. The same logic applies to the
ESG (ﬁgure 2a), but now the offers are restricted to
either ($5, $5) or ($8, $2). Game theory predicts that
player 2 should accept any positive offer, and player 1,
reasoning this way, should offer player 2 some small
amount, such as the proposal of ($8, $2) in the ESG.
Alternatively, the evolution of competitive instincts
may cause player 2 to reject unequal offers in favour of
more equal offers. While a rejection is costly, since both
players get nothing, the threat of rejection often will
improve a player’s terms of trade (Hoffman et al.1 9 9 8 ).
Further evidence for the evolution of inequity aversion
has been reported byBrosnan & DeWaal (2003) intheir
experiments with capuchin monkeys. Inequity aversion
may lead to a willingness to engage in costly punishment
(or negative reciprocity) in order to protect one from
aggressive behaviour. Note, however, within the game is
the implicit property right that allows player 2 to reject
the offer without the threat of retaliation. While both
players are clearly better off getting something, competi-
tive instincts can cause them to get nothing. This
suggests that an ability to deduce the mental state of the
other person may help players calibrate their decisions
to each other’s mental state in order to avoid getting
nothing (Frith & Frith 1999).
The DG was introduced as a means to control for
the effects of punishment threats in the UG (ﬁgure 2c;
Forsythe et al. 1994). In this game, a person is given
$10 by the experimenter and is asked how he/she would
like to divide the money between himself/herself and an
anonymous person.
In the IG, two players are given some amount of
money, say $10. Player 1 is then given the opportunity
to send none, some or all of his/her $10 to player 2
(Berg et al. 1995; ﬁgure 2d). Whatever amount of
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Figure 2. Bargaining and trust games: (a) equal split game (ESG), (b) ultimatum game (UG), (c) dictator game (DG),
(d) investment game (IG), (e) trust game (TG). P1, player 1; P2, player 2; A, accept; R, reject; ni, decision nodes; ti,
terminal nodes.
Review. Economic game playing F. Krueger et al. 3861
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2008)money player 1 sends is increased by the experimenter
by some amount, say tripled, e.g. if player 1 sends all
$10, then player 2 will get $30. Player 2 then decides
how much of the tripled money to send back to player 1.
The TG is a simpler version of the IG where player 1
is restricted to the option of sending nothing or sending
all $10, and if the $10 is sent, then player 2 is restricted
to either send nothing back or send half of the tripled
amount, or $15, back (ﬁgure 2e). Game theory predicts
that player 2 will send nothing back, and that player 1
will realize this and send nothing as well.
Alternatively, the evolution of reciprocity behaviours
may cause the second player to feel a social obligation
towards player 1’s trust, i.e. by sending money. Note
that the terms of exchange can be explicit, negotiated
in a previous game, or implicit, established by social
norms. Consequently, player 2’s decision to cheat can
be against either an explicit or implicit standard of
reciprocity. While both players are clearly better off
by extending trust and being willing to reciprocate,
their competitive instincts can cause them to get
nothing. This again suggests that an ability to deduce
the mental state of the other person may help player
1’s decisions when to trust and may help player 2’s
decisions when to reciprocate.
(b) Game theoretic analysis of neuroeconomics
games
Nash (1950) proposed a theory to predict player’s
behaviour in matrix games in terms of the Nash
equilibrium (NE) of the game. A NE in pure strategies
for a two-person matrix game is a strategy proﬁle
ðs 
1;s 
2Þ that satisﬁes the following conditions:
U1ðs
 
1;s
 
2ÞRU1ðs1;s
 
2Þ for all s1 2S1 ð1:1Þ
and
U2ðs
 
1;s
 
2ÞRU2ðs
 
1;s2Þ for all s2 2S2: ð1:2Þ
It is easy to verify that s 
1Zdefect and s 
2Zdefect is the
only NE in pure strategies for the PDG (ﬁgure 1d).
Furthermore, there are no pure strategy proﬁles that
satisfy (i) and (ii) for the ISG or the MPG.
Nash (1950) recognized this problem and extended
his equilibrium concept to allowfor mixedstrategies, or
probability distributions over S1 and S2. In two-person
games, with two choices each, we can deﬁne a mixed
strategy as follows. Let DS1Z{(p
1, p
2)R0: p
1Cp
2Z1},
where we interpret p
1 as the probability of playing
the pure row strategy r
1, and p
2 as the probability of
playing the pure row strategy r
2, then p2DS1 is a
mixed strategy for player 1 and, similarly, q2DS2Z
{(q
1, q
2)R0: q
1Cq
2Z1} is a mixed strategy for player 2.
Given a mixed strategy proﬁle (p, q), we can deﬁne the
expected utility for player 1 as follows:
EU1ðp;qÞ Zp
1q
1U1ðr
1;c
1ÞCp
1q
2U1ðr
1;c
2Þ
Cp
2q
1U1ðr
2;c
1ÞCp
2q
2U1ðr
2;c
2Þ: ð1:3Þ
Similarly, the expected utility for player 2 is as follows:
EU2ðp;qÞ Zp
1q
1U2ðr
1;c
1ÞCp
1q
2U2ðr
1;c
2Þ
Cp
2q
1U2ðr
2;c
1ÞCp
2q
2U2ðr
2;c
2Þ: ð1:4Þ
A NE in mixed strategies for a two-person game,
with each person having two pure strategies, is a
mixed strategy proﬁle (p
 , q
 )t h a ts a t i s ﬁ e st h e
following conditions:
EU1ðp
 ;q
 ÞREU1ðp;q
 Þ for all p 2DS1 ð1:5Þ
and
EU2ðp
 ;q
 ÞREU2ðp
 ;qÞ for all q 2DS2: ð1:6Þ
Note that a pure strategy NE is a mixed strategy NE
with all the probability weight on one of the pure
strategies. Nash (1950) proved that every strategic
game has a NE in mixed strategies and that every
pure strategy, which has a positive weight in a mixed
strategy NE, must have the same expected utility
for the player, for example EU1(W, q
 )ZEU1(S, q
 ).
Using this result, it is easy to solve for p
 Z(1KC, C)
and q
 Z(0.5, 0.5) for the ISG, with 0!C!1,
p
 Z(0.5, 0.5) and q
 Z(0.5, 0.5) for the MPG, and
p
 Z(1/3,1/3,1/3)andq
 Z(1/3,1/3,1/3)fortheRSPG.
We can now write the pure strategy choices for a
player in an extensive form game as a choice of branch
at each of his/her decision nodes. So, for example, in
the ESG, player 1 has the strategy set S1Z{E, wE}
while player 2 has the strategy set S2Z{(A, a), (A, r),
(R, a) and (R, r)}, where the ﬁrst element of each pair is
the choice made at n2 and the second element is the
choice made at n3. We can deﬁne a mixed strategy
proﬁle (p, q) and a NE proﬁle (p
 , q
 ) as before. Note
that, for the ESG, there are a number of NE proﬁles
including (E,( A, a), (E,( A, r)) and (wE,( R, a)).
Selten (1975) offered as reﬁnement of NE the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (or SPNE) of the game. In
the game shown in ﬁgure 2, we can ﬁnd the SPNE of
t h eg a m eb yu s i n gb a c k w a r di n d u c t i o n .S o ,f o r
example, in the ESG, we can start with the nodes n2
and n3 and ask what player 2’s optimal choice is at each.
The answer is for player 2 to always accept or (A, a).
But given this choice, player 1 should now play E
resulting in the SPNE proﬁle (E,( A, a)). A similar
unique SPNE proﬁle holds for the UG, resulting in
player 1 asking and getting 10Ke, where e is the
smallest divisible monetary unit.
If a game is repeated a number of times, this can lead
to new strategies by players, in particular, where the
strategychosenfor the current gameismadeconditional
on previous plays of the game. For example, in the
PDG, the tit-for-tat strategy studied extensively by
Axelrod (1984) has a player who chooses to cooperate
in the ﬁrst play of the game and then in every play
thereafter it has the player play whatever his/her
opponent played in the previous play. While tit-for-tat is
not a NE for a ﬁnitely repeated PDG, it can (when
played against similar conditional strategies) result in
better pay-offs for long periods of play than simply
defecting in each period.
(c) Experimental design for the measurement
and control of expected utility
Any game can be turned into an experiment by
assigning subjects (either human or non-humans) to
the role of one of the players in the game. Subjects
make decisions, either by choosing strategies or by
choosing an action at each decision node in these roles.
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salient reward for each outcome reached. Treatment
conditions can then be varied to observe their effect on
strategy choices. There are two important concerns in
designing a game theory experiment: the ﬁrst involves
the ability to control or measure individuals’ subjective
values over outcomes in the game, and the second is
the ability to control or account for the expansion of the
strategy space due to repeated play of the game.
Generally, human subjects are incentivized with a
monetary pay-off at each outcome while animals are
incentivized with food(orjuice) pay-offs. Thisallowsthe
experimenter to induce a utility function over outcomes
that is sufﬁcient for studying pure strategy choices and
pure strategy NE. This induction procedure assumes
that subjects prefer more of the pay-off to less and that
their decision costs of making a choice is low relatively
to reward (Smith 1976). If such an assumption is
suspected, pay-offs can be increased, through, for
example, food deprivation in animal experiments, and/
or explicit models of decision cost can be introduced to
examine the data (e.g. Smith & Walker 1993).
When we consider mixed strategy NE, it is no longer
certain that paying money induces the right preferences,
since expected utility is a probabilistic weighting of the
subject’s true utility function. We can solve this problem
either by estimating a subject’s underlying utility
function (Holt & Laury 2005) or by inducing such
preferences by paying subjects in probability using the
lottery procedure (Berg et al. 1986). Both approaches
can lead to problems. Estimating preferences makes
additional assumptions, which are routinely violated in
experiments and can lead to very different estimates of
expected utility based on the elicitation technique used
(Berg et al. 2005). Inducing preferences also makes
additional assumptions as it requires subjects to make
calculationsthatareindependentfromtheirpreferences,
thuschanging the nature of their decision and increasing
their decision costs.
2. PRIMATES PLAYING ECONOMIC GAMES
While many species of animals have been studied in
terms of games, the closest evolutionarily to humans
are the other primates. First, we consider some of the
single-cell ﬁring studies that have been conducted
while primates played games against a computer, and
then we consider some of the experimental studies of
primate behaviour in games with other primates.
(a) Primate behaviour in games against
a computer
Lee et al.( 2 0 0 4 )examined the strategy choices of rhesus
monkeys while playing a computer opponent in the
MPG. The computer played three different strategies.
Strategy 1 played the NE strategy (1/2, 1/2), making the
monkey indifferent between playing H or T. Strategy 2
examined the monkeys play to see whether it could
exploit any bias towards one of the choices, and if so
exploited that bias. Strategy 3 extended strategy 2 by
looking for serial correlation in the monkeys’ choices
and exploiting this bias as well. When the monkeys
played against strategy 1, they tended to be biased
towards one of the target choices and did not play the
NE strategy. When the monkeys played strategy 2 they
adjusted their strategies to play 50–50 as predicted by
NE, but their choices were serially correlated as they
tended to stick with a winning choice and switch from a
losing choice. Finally, when the monkeys played strategy
3 they again adjusted their strategies to become less
serially correlated and thus predictable. In a follow-up
experiment, monkeys played the RSPG against a
computer again following the three strategies (Lee
2005). Again, the monkeys adjusted their strategies to
the strategy of the computer, although this time when
playing against strategy 2, the monkeys tended to best
respond to the computer’s last play of the game.
Lee and his colleagues found that neurons in the
dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) were involved in
encoding strategic choices (Barraclough et al. 2004;
Seo & Lee 2007). The authors found that a reinforce-
ment learning model predicted the monkeys’
behaviour, but the adaptive feature of the monkeys’
responses to the different computer strategies was not
explained by this model. Soltani et al. (2006) provided
a neuronal model of monkey choices for the MPG.
Their model adapts Wang’s (2002) attractor network
m o d e lw h e r er e c u r r e n te x c i t a t i o nw i t h i nal o c a l
population of neurons together with an inhibitory
network between populations can implement a ramp-
ing-to-threshold decision process. Within their model,
Soltani et al. (2006) found that they can capture the
adaptive changes in strategy choices if they include a
belief-dependent learning rule that updates the synap-
tic strengths of neurons selecting for both chosen and
unchosen actions. The demonstration of a biologically
feasible computational process that can explain the
functional choices of monkeys brings us one step
closer to understanding how strategies can be learned,
but it remains to be seen if the modelling in this
case can be generalized to games with many or even a
continuum of strategies, or to strategies in extensive
form games. In particular, belief learning may have
to be combined with more explicit accounts of
decision costs.
Dorris & Glimcher (2004) examined the behaviour
of monkeys and humans playing the ISG as they vary
inspection costs and thus the mixed strategy of the
worker. They found very similar behaviour in humans
who played other humans, in humans playing a
computer strategy (similar to strategy 2 in Lee et al.
2004) and in monkeys playing the same computer
strategy. In every treatment, subjects’ average 20 trial
plays were predicted by the mixed strategy NE for
inspection costs of 0.5 and above, but workers
(monkeys and humans) tended to shirk above the
equilibrium prediction when inspection costs were 0.4
and lower. However, in examining neurons in the
anterior parietal cortex (LIP area) of the monkeys
using a choice design similar to Platt & Glimcher
(1999), they found that the average ﬁring rates of these
neurons encode the relative expected desirability of the
choices to shirk versus the choice to work. The authors
conclude that even when subjects’ strategies deviated
from the NE prediction they still played according to
the relative expected utility calculations in LIP, which
they now call physiological expected utility.
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other primates
A number of behavioural experiments involving
exchange type games have been run with monkeys.
De Waal (1997) found that capuchins would engage in
reciprocal sharing through facilitated taking in a
delayed exchange task where monkeys had alternate
access to a source of food. In a related task, de Waal &
Berger (2000) showed that capuchins will increase
facilitated taking when they have been helped by
another monkey to acquire food in a cooperative bar
pull. When capuchin monkeys are allowed to trade
tokens for food, Brosnan & De Waal (2003) demon-
strated that monkeys will reject an exchange with the
experimenter after they observe another monkey
getting a better deal. Recently, Jensen et al. (2007)
looked at chimpanzees’ strategies in the ESG. The
authors found that monkey responders accepted any
offers no matter how unequal; however, monkey
proposers did not take maximal advantage of the
responders’ strategies. Why did not chimpanzees
s h o wi n e q u i t ya v e r s i o ni nt h eE S G ?Brosnan &
de Waal (2004) argued that monkeys housed together
for 30 years do not exhibit inequity aversion, in the
trade for tokens task, and it may be that such long-term
groups have worked out repeated game strategies that
no longer require inequity responses. Overall, these
results suggest that monkeys will choose reciprocal
strategies to improve cooperative gains; while monkeys
show inequity aversion, it is less clear whether monkeys
will act on inequity aversion in bargaining games and
this may depend on whether or not they have had time
to develop alternative repeat game strategies.
3. HUMANS PLAYING ECONOMIC GAMES
Experiments on human subjects have focused on
various two-person forms of classic social dilemma
games involving the conﬂict between self-interest and
mutual interest. The most well-known social dilemma
is the PDG, but from an economics perspective, more
interesting social dilemma games are those that capture
human exchange such as the UG, IG and TG. In
studying human exchange, it is important to have a
control condition, the DG, which can help sort out the
role of sympathy as compared with reciprocity.
(a) Human behaviour in the Prisoner’s dilemma
game and its neural correlates
The PDG has been studied extensively with experi-
ments (Axelrod 1984, 1997) which report on experi-
ments where subjects submitted strategies to play other
subjects’ strategies in a repeated PD game, and report
on subsequent agent-based models of PD strategies. In
his tournaments, Axelrod (1984) found that a simple
strategy called tit-for-tat (submitted by Rapoport &
Chammah 1965) ﬁnished ﬁrst. This strategy was very
s i m p l e ;i ts t a r t sb yc o o p e r a t i n ga n dt h e nm i m i c s
whatever its opponent did in the previous period.
Note that the worst-case scenario, if tit-for-tat plays the
always defect strategy, is the (C, D) pay-off in the ﬁrst
period, but this is more than offset by tit-for-tat’s ability
to cooperate, and reach (C, C), with other cooperative
strategies. More recently, Bo (2005) has studied the
subjects’ behaviour under more controlled conditions
in both one-shot and repeated play lasting either a ﬁnite
number of plays (ﬁnite horizon games), or when there
was a ﬁxed probability that play will end on a given
round (inﬁnite horizon games). The author found that
subjects cooperated only 10 per cent of the time in a
one-shot PDG, but ﬁrst-period cooperation increased
to roughly 35 per cent in games lasting four plays, but
fell back to 10 per cent by the fourth play. Finally, ﬁrst-
period cooperation started at 46 per cent in games with
a 3/4 chance of continued play, and stayed statistically
higher (approx. 30%) for all periods compared with the
10 per cent rate found in one-shot or cooperative rates
of play in the last period of ﬁnite horizon games.
Neuroeconomics and social neuroscience experi-
ments have begun to study some of the neural
underpinnings of economic game playing. Using
fMRI, Rilling et al. (2002) scanned the brains of
women who played other women (or a computer) for at
least 20 rounds of a PDG. Subjects who experienced
continued (C, C) outcomes showed higher activation in
the ventral striatum, but subjects who played cooperate
also showed a decrease inventral striatum activity when
they saw that their opponent played defect. Activity in
the ventral striatum is consistent with a reinforcement
learning model where subjects expect that cooperation
will result in the higher (C, C) pay-off. Orbitofrontal
cortex activity was correlated with the evaluation of
outcomes by post-scan interviews with peak magni-
tudes of ﬁtted BOLD responses the highest at CC
outcomes, reported by subjects as most desirable, next
highest at CD outcomes, third highest at DC outcomes
and the lowest ﬁt DD outcomes, reported by subjects
as least desirable. Finally, activation in the rostral ACC
was more active when subjects choose to cooperate
after their partner cooperated; this is consistent with
the role of the ACC in the detection of cognitive
conﬂict (Carter et al. 2000). In a follow-up experiment
by Rilling et al. (2004b), subjects played repeated one-
shot PDGs with different counterparts. The fMRI
experiment replicated the earlier ﬁndings and strength-
ened the conclusion that subjects in repeat PDGs learn
to cooperate by using neural-based reinforcement
learning strategies. Finally, Rilling et al. (2007) have
also looked at the effect of (C, D) outcomes on subjects
who played cooperatively only to be defected on. The
authors ﬁnd that male subjects who scored high on the
Levenson total psychopathy test showed less amygdala
activation when encountering a (C, D) outcome, and
were less cooperative over all. It may be that amygdala
responses to (C, D) cause subjects to avoid behaviours
that can lead to this outcome byeither defecting against
a cooperative partner (and thus inviting retaliation) or
cooperating against a non-cooperative partner.
In addition, a number of pharmacological inter-
ventions have been studied in subjects playing PDG- or
PD-like games. For example, Tse & Bond (2002a)
found that a single dose of reboxetine, a noradrenaline
reuptake inhibitor that elevates the extracellular
concentration of the neurotransmitter noradrenaline,
resulted in more cooperative play in subjects playing a
repeated PD-like game. In a follow-up study, Tse &
Bond (2002b) looked at the effects of a two-week
treatment with citalopram, a serotonin reuptake
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cooperatively in a PD-like game. Moreover, Wood et al.
(2006) found that subjects deprived of L-tryptophan,
and thus having lower serotonin levels in the brain,
were less cooperative in a repeated PDG than subjects
who were not. However, lower cooperation was only
found on the ﬁrst day of a two-day study, suggesting
that subjects who are L-tryptophan depleted will ﬁnd
ways to adjust back to a more cooperative strategy.
(b) Human behaviour in the dictator game and its
neural correlates
In the DG, a person is given $10 by the experimenter
and is asked how he/she would like to divide the money
between himself/herself and an anonymous person
(Forsythe et al. 1994). When this game is run as an
experiment only 21 per cent of the subjects kept all the
money. The money that is sent is sometimes seen as a
measure of altruism, or at least sympathy, that subjects
have to one another. Alternatively, Hoffman et al.
(1996) hypothesized that our evolved social brain
would be sensitive to the likelihood of being seen as
and/or found out to be non-cooperative based on one’s
group behaviour. The authors called the inverse of this
likelihood ‘social distance’ and hypothesized that the
greater the social distance, the lower the likelihood of
being typed as non-cooperative, and the more likely a
subject will keep all the money. In their double-blind
experiment, designed to maximize social distance,
subjects were much more self-interested with a
majority, 64 per cent, keeping all the money.
Both the Forsythe et al. (1994) and the Hoffman
et al. (1996) experiments can be criticized owing to the
use of ‘house money’. Cherry et al. (2002) examined
dictator’s giving when the dictator had to earn their
money in the experiment, before deciding how much to
send. Using a double-blind control, they found that 95
per cent of the dictators kept the money, suggesting
that a subject’s sense of ownership or entitlement to the
money will affect how much they will give. In social
psychology, equity theory can be used to explain the
results from these and many similar experiments
(Adams 1965). Equity theory assumes that subjects
in an experiment assign subjective weights to the
contribution of themselves and others and expect to
receive earnings for themselves, and for other subjects,
to be proportional to their relative contributions. When
subjects fail to earn what they expect, or they see other
subjects failing to earn what they expect those subjects
should get, this can cause a negative emotion, which
subjects may try to avoid or which may motivate
corrective action. When using house money, subjects
may view showing up for the experiment as the major
contribution, while earning money may shift subjects’
views to contributions made in the experiment.
In a recent fMRI experiment, Spitzer et al. (2007)
investigated brain activities of dictators when there was
a possibility that they could be punished by recipients
compared with dictators who were safe from punish-
ment. Subjects were given an additional amount of
money each round, but, in the punishment condition,
recipients were told they could either keep this money
or use it to reduce their dictator’s earning. In particular,
one unit of money spent by the recipient reduces the
dictator’s earning by ﬁve units. The threat of punish-
ment effectively provides an immediate consequence to
getting caught, causing dictators to be signiﬁcantly
more generous. The authors used the Machiavelli
instrument (Christie & Geis 1970) to predict how
selﬁsh subjects will be towards others. They found that
subjects with high Mach scores showed the greatest
transfer differences between conditions. Furthermore,
the higher the subject’s Mach score was,the greater was
the amount of insula activity. Finally, the right DLPFC
and right caudate nucleus showed increased brain
activity as the average transfer difference between
conditions became larger. It would be interesting to
see how these results change when dictators are able to
earn their money.
(c) Human behaviour in the ultimatum game and
its neural correlates
When the UG was ﬁrst run with cash-motivated
subjects, Gu ¨th et al. (1982) observed that the modal
proposal was to split the money 50–50. This result has
been replicated dozens of times. For example, Forsythe
et al. (1994) compared offers in the UG with those in
the DG and showed that the 50–50 proposals in the
UG are largely a consequence of player 2’s ability to
reject player 1’s proposal. Thus, to reduce the risk of
rejection, player 1 makes more conciliatory offers.
Hoffman et al. (1994) tested the predictions of social
exchange theory in the UG. The authors included two
social exchange conditions. A contest in which subjects
earned the right to be player 1 and a socially deﬁned
seller/buyer exchange roles for players 1 and 2 were
compared with a baseline condition with random
assignment to the ﬁrst player position and neutral role
deﬁnitions. In the baseline condition, half of the offers
were at $5 with a mean offer to player 2 of $4.37. By
comparison, the property right assignments with buyer/
seller roles resulted in less than 10 per cent of the offers
at 50–50 with a mean offer to player 2 of $3.08, which
was predicted by authors to have the strongest equity
norm effect. In both cases, rejection rates were low, at
approximately 10 per cent, suggesting that ﬁrst players’
low offers were no more risky. This suggests further
that second players implicitly recognized the right of
their counterpart to offer less when they had earned
the right to do so.
In an fMRI study, McCabe et al. (2001) studied
brain activation in humans who played sequential two-
person simpliﬁed UGs and TGs for cash rewards. Half
of the time, subjects played as player 1, the other half as
player 2. Each time they played, their counterpart was
either a computer playing a ﬁxed probabilistic strategy
or a human who was recruited to play outside the
scanner. Subjects were told for each play whether they
were playing the computer or the human. The authors
conjectured that subjects would use mentalizing
(Frith & Frith 1999) to infer the intentions of the
other player. Mentalizing would play an important
role in the binding of mutual pay-off information to
a cooperative event representation and thus invoke
cognitively strategies for delay of gratiﬁcation, and
therefore produce trust and reciprocity. Based on
their individual plays, seven out of the 12 subjects
were labelled as cooperators while ﬁve were labelled as
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cooperators all showed greater activations in the
anterior region of the rostral medial prefrontal cortex
(arMFC). Recent research has shown that the arMFC
is not only involved in representing our own thoughts,
feelings and beliefs, but also in representing the mental
states of other people, and is activated in a variety of
social cognition tasks such as self-knowledge, person
perception and mentalizing (for a review see Amodio &
Frith 2006). The authors argue that the observed acti-
vation in cooperators is consistent with shared
reciprocity intentions, resulting in the inhibition of
both individual reward seeking by player 2 and risk-
avoiding behaviour by player 1.
I na n o t h e rf M R Is t u d y ,Sanfey et al. (2003)
investigated the neural correlates of the second player’s
behaviour in the UG. Subjects made 20 decisions,
while playing 10 games with other individuals and 10
games with the computer. In the human counterpart
condition, subjects were told they would play once
against each of 10 different humans, but, in fact, the
experimenters determined the sequence of offers
subjects would face to ensure that the human and
computer offers were counterbalanced between ﬁve
50–50 (fair), one 70–30 (less fair), two 80–20 (unfair)
and two 90–10 (unfair) offers. Behaviourally, subjects
accepted all fair and most of the less-fair offers,
however rejected roughly 50 per cent of the unfair
offers by humans, while accepting roughly 80 per cent
of the unfair offers by the computer. The authors found
by contrasting unfair with fair offer activations in the
ACC, bilateral DLPFC and bilateral anterior insula
( A I ) .S p e c i ﬁ c a l l y ,a st h ea c t i v a t i o no fr i g h tA I
increased, the more probably a subject rejected an
unfair offer. The authors argue that the ACC activation
reﬂects the motivational conﬂict between fairness and
self-interest when facing unfair offers, the AI activation
the degree of emotional resentment of unfair offers and
the DLPFC the cognitive control of the emotional
impulse to reject unfair offers.Importantly, Knoch et al.
(2006a) found in a subsequent study that low-
frequency TMS of the right DLPFC, but not of the
left DLPFC, increased the acceptance rate of unfair
offers relative to a placebo stimulation (from 9 to 44%).
The authors concluded that the right DLPFC is not
critical in controlling the impulse to reject unfair offers.
It may be that DLPFC instead represents offers as fair
and unfair and that subjects with impaired DLPFC
simply accepted all offers.
Another fMRI study by Tabibnia et al. (2008)
investigated the neural correlates of the recipient’s
behaviour in the UG and found AI activation during
rejected trials. In addition, the authors found activation
in the right VLPFC (relative to a resting baseline) when
unfair offers were accepted, indicating that this region
might regulate the resentment associated with unfair
offers down.
The Sanfey et al. (2003) experiment resulted in a
follow-up behavioural study by Xiao & Houser (2005),
who investigated the emotional expressions of subjects
in the UG and found that subjects (second players)
who can express anger (or disgust) to their counterpart
(ﬁrst players) for an unfair offer are signiﬁcantly more
likely to then accept the offer.
(d) Human behaviour in the investment/trust
game and its neural correlates
Berg et al. (1995) gave two players $10 as a show-up fee
in a double-blind IG. Player 1 was then given the
opportunity to send none, some or all of his/her $10 to
player 2. Whatever amount of money was sent was
tripled, e.g. if player 1 sent all $10, then player 2 would
get $30. Player 2 then decided how much of the tripled
money to send back to player 1. The subgame perfect
equilibrium prediction is that player 2 should keep all
the money, and therefore player 1 should send nothing.
Alternatively, social norms may exist that interpret
sending money as an obligation for player 2 to
reciprocate. All but two of the 32 players sent some
amount of money to the other player, with two-thirds
sending $5 or more, and about half of these high-trust
subjects got more sent back to them than they originally
sent before tripling.
McCabe & Smith (2000) introduced the TG as a
s i m p l i ﬁ e df o r mo ft h eI G .T h eg a m eh a so n l yt w o
choices for each player. Player 1 can choose to end the
game by moving left, giving each player $10, or
choose to continue the game. If player 1 chose to
continue, player 2 can choose between either player 1
gets $15 and player 2 gets $25 or player 1 gets $0 and
player 2 gets $40. The choice made by player 1 is risky
and can be interpreted as trusting player 2, since
player 1 gave up $10 and might end up with $0.
Similarly, the decision by player 2 to choose that
player 1 gets $15 and player 2 gets $25 can be
interpreted as being trustworthy since player 2 gave
up $40 and only received $25. When played as a one-
shot game, half of the player 1’s were trusting and
three-quarters of the player 2’s, who then get to move,
were trustworthy.
To test whether mentalizing may be important in
playing the TGs, McCabe et al. (2003) compared
behaviour in the standard TG with behaviour in an
involuntary TG where player 1 is forced to move down
and player 2 was informed about it. The authors found
that player 2 is twice as likely to make the trustworthy
decision in the TG compared with player 2 in the
involuntary TG. They argue that the increased
propensity to reciprocate player 1’s trust in the TG
occurred because player 2 inferred player 1’s intentions
to cooperate since player 1 has given up a sure thing,
i.e. $10, to make them both better off. This inference is
what leads to a greater trustworthiness.
Repetition of the IG allows players to form a
reputation with respect to a behavioural type (such as
being a trusting or trustworthy individual). Using a
multiround version of the IG, King-Casas et al. (2005)
found that responses in the dorsal striatum (head of
caudate nucleus) of player 2 were greatest when player
1 invested more in response to player 2’s previous
reciprocity. In addition, player 2’s intention to recipro-
cate was observed as a shift in peak activity in the
caudate nucleus from the time when player 2 saw player
1’s decision to before player 1’s decision, suggesting
that player 2 learnt to anticipate player 1’s trustworthi-
ness. It has been proposed that the caudate nucleus
may serve as a key component of an ‘actor–critic’
model processing the contingent behaviour that led
to the feedback, with the purpose of guiding future
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Furthermore, Tomlin et al. (2006) applied fMRI
to scan two subjects’ brains simultaneously as they
played repeated interaction IG. These joint brain
measurements showed agent-speciﬁc responses along
the cingulate cortex for encoding decisions of other
and oneself independently on metrical aspect of the
economic exchange.
In another iterated version of the IG, Delgado et al.
(2005) investigated whether prior social and moral
information about potential trading partners affects this
aforementioned neural reward circuit. Subjects were
involved in two-person interactions and asked to make
risky decisions about whether to trust ﬁctitious trading
partners after they received vivid descriptions of life
events that indicated either their neutral, praiseworthy
or suspect moral character. Although all three ﬁctitious
partners repaid in the IG with the same frequency, the
caudate nucleus activated more strongly for repayment
outcomes from the neutral partner, but not from the
other partners. The authors argue that prior moral
beliefs can inﬂuence economic decision making. Since
the neutral partner represents unpredictable outcomes
and there is more to learn, the human caudate nucleus
presumably inﬂuenced the adjustment of choices based
on feedback mechanisms in the neural circuitry of trial-
and-error reward learning.
Furthermore, de Quervain et al. (2004) investigated
the neural basis of altruistic punishment of defectors in
the context of the IG. Using PET, subject’s brains were
scanned while they learnt about the defector’s abuse of
trust and determined the punishment. This experiment
demonstrated that the dorsal striatum (caudate
nucleus) was activated in the contrast between effective
punishment (reduction of the defector’s pay-off) and
symbolic punishment (non-reduction of the defector’s
pay-off). Subjects with stronger activations in the
dorsal striatum were willing to incur greater costs to
punish. The authors argue that individuals derive
satisfaction from punishing norm violations and the
anticipated satisfaction from punishing defectors is
reﬂected in the dorsal striatum activations.
Krueger et al. (2007) investigated the neural cor-
relates of trust combining fMRI with a non-anonymous
repeated TG. The authors showed that two different
brain systems may be used to develop the ﬁrst player’s
trust. A personal ‘unconditional’ trust system involved
early activation of the arMFC (mentalizing) followed
by later activation of the septal area, a limbic region
that has been demonstrated to modulate various
aspects of social behaviour such as social attachment
(Numan 2000) by controlling anterior hypothalamic
functions and the release of the neuropeptides vaso-
pressin and oxytocin (Powell & Rorie 1967; Loup et al.
1991; Insel & Young 2001). Besides the well-known
physiological functions of oxytocin in milk let-down
and during labour, oxytocin is a key mediator in
facilitating various complex social behaviours, inclu-
ding maternal care (Insel & Young 2001), pair bonding
(Insel & Shapiro 1992) andsocial recognition (Choleris
et al. 2003) in animals and social attachment (Bartels &
Zeki 2004; Aron et al. 2005), generosity (Zak et al.
2007) and interpersonal trust (Zak et al. 2005)i n
humans. The authors argue that repeated experience
with another player’s cooperation can lead to the
evaluation of that player as a ‘trustworthy’ person,
resulting in an increased production of oxytocin and
allowing greater trust. A second ‘conditional’ trust
system seems to be more situational and less personal.
This system does not use the mentalizing system early
on but does use the reinforcement learning system
(ventral tegmental area) to build trust. In brains using
this system, mentalizing activation was observed in the
latter stagesofplay,butnotinearlyplay,suggestingthat
situational trust uses the mentalizing system to ﬁne-
tune expectations over when a counterpart will defect.
There is recent evidence that greater ﬁrst player’s
trust can be induced in strangers by the intranasal
administration of oxytocin during interpersonal
exchange. Kosfeld et al. (2005) showed that the effect
of oxytocin on trust is not due to a general increase in
the readiness to bear risks, but it speciﬁcally affects an
individual’s willingness to accept social risks arising
through interpersonal interactions. In a follow-up
fMRI experiment, Baumgartner et al. (2008) found
that subjects who were given synthetic oxytocin
intranasally showed no change in their trusting
behaviour after they learned that their trust has been
betrayed several times. Differences in trust adaptation
were associated with reduction in activation in neural
systems mediating fear processing (amygdala and
midbrain regions) and adaptation to feedback infor-
mation (dorsal striatum).
4. TRUST AND RECIPROCITY IN HUMANS: AN
fMRI INVESTIGATION
Previous analyses of the IG and TG games indicate the
importance of different systems such as mentalizing,
reward systems and social attachment for the neuro-
biology of trusting and reciprocity. However, little
attempt has been made so far to identify the differences
of underlying neural architecture for trusting and
reciprocating behaviour. We present here additional
analyses of the repeated TG experiment studied in
Krueger et al. (2007). In this experiment, two strangers
of the same sex—each in a separate MRI scanner—
interacted with one another in a sequential reciprocal
TG while their brains were simultaneously scanned
(ﬁgure 3a). Subjects were asked to make sequential
decisions for monetary pay-offs (low, medium or high
in cents) presented in a binary game tree (ﬁgure 3b).
Player 1 can either quit the game by not trusting
player 2, resulting in a small equal pay-off for both,
or player 1 can continue the game by trusting player 2,
hoping to receive a better pay-off. Player 2 can recipro-
cate the ﬁrst player’s trust, giving them both a higher
pay-off, or defect on player 1’s trust, resulting in an
even higher pay-off for player 2 and a pay-off of zero
for player 1. In the control games, partners followed
the same timeline as in the TGs, but they did not have
to interact with one another and merely had to choose
between lower and higher monetary rewards. The
design of our experiment allowed us to address the
question of which brain regions modulate trust and
reciprocity during economic exchange.
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Using a general linear model analysis, we ﬁrst sought
brain regions whose BOLD responses were commonly
recruited for decisions to trust and reciprocate. We
identiﬁed two regions, the arMFC and the AI, by
performing a conjunction analysis between decisions to
trust and reciprocate (ﬁgure 4a).
Converging evidence from neuroimaging over the
last decade suggests that the arMFC plays a critical role
in mentalizing, which is the ability to represent another
person’s psychological perspective (for a review see
Amodio & Frith 2006). It has been shown that
mentalizing is impaired in autism (Baron-Cohen et al.
1985), schizophrenia (Frith & Corcoran 1996)a n d
cerebral lesions (Stone et al. 1998; Happe et al. 1999;
Stuss et al. 2001). A wide range of different paradigms
has shown consistently arMFC activation, ranging
from off-line tasks such as story and cartoon compre-
hension as well as viewing of real-time interactions
(Gallagher et al. 2000; Frith & Frith 2003; Saxe et al.
2004) to online tasks such as playing economic games
(McCabe et al. 2001; Gallagher et al. 2002; Rilling et al.
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Figure 3. Experimentaldesign.(a)Timelineforasingletrustgame.Partnerswereintroducedbyseeingeachother viawebcamand
digital photographs were taken to be used for game trials. A 2 s introductory screen informed partners of the role that they were
playing(P1orP2).P1sawthegametree,hadtomakeadecision(non-trustortrust)within6 sandwaited6 sforP2’sdecisionwhile
seeinga blank screen.P2sawablankscreenfor6 s,sawthegametree withP1’sdecisionandhadtomakea decision(reciprocateor
defect) within 6 s. If P1 had chosen not to trust P2, the game was over and P2 saw P1’s decision for 6 s. The partners saw the
outcome of the game for 4 s followed by a blank screen with a jittered inter-stimulus interval of 2–6 s. (The partners played 36
voluntary trust games and 16 control games.) (b) Voluntary trust game. Partners made sequential decisions as ﬁrst player (P1) and
secondplayer (P2)for pay-offsincents(c: [cP1,cP2]) presented ina binary decisiontree.P1canchooseleft(non-trust)and quitthe
game with a small pay-off for P1 and P2 (e.g. [5,5]) or can choose right (trust) to continue the game. P2 can then choose left
(reciprocate)giving thembotha higher pay-off (e.g.[10,15]) orchooseright (defect) resulting inaneven higher pay-off toP2and a
pay-off of zero to P1 (e.g. [0,25]). Pay-offs (p10–p60) were split into three types: low (p10–p20); medium (p30–p40); and high (p50–p60).
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et al. 2008). We argue that mentalizing allows both
players to predict the behaviour of the other and to
engage successfully in a cooperative interaction by
recognizing that the other player has independent
experiences, beliefs and intentions. Both players have
to think about how the other player thinks about them,
i.e. before they invest they have to decide not just
whether they trust their partner, but also whether their
partner will reciprocate their trust.
The AI region has been consistently associated with
empathy, which plays a fundamental social role
allowing the sharing of experience, feelings and
goals across individuals (Preston & de Waal 2002).
Two major roles for empathy have been proposed
(de Vignemont & Singer 2006): an epistemological role
to provide information about the future actions of other
individuals and a social role to serve as the origin of the
motivation for cooperative and pro-social behaviour.
Recent neuroimaging studies have shown that individ-
uals share the emotions of others, when exposed to
their emotions by the observation or imagination, and
they activated parts of the same neuronal network as if
they would have processed the same state in themselves
(Wicker et al. 2003; Keysers et al. 2004; Singer et al.
2004b; Jackson et al. 2005).
In a recent fMRI study, Singer et al. (2006) has
shown that the empathic response can be modulated by
the reputation of the person we are observing. Subjects
ﬁrst played repeated PDGs to create good and bad
reputations for two previously unknown partners.
Afterwards, the brain activity of those subjects was
measured while they observed that their confederates
received pain. An empathy-related activation was
observed in the AI and ACC, when the cooperative
player was in pain. On the contrary, less empathy-
related activation was observed for partners who had
acquired a bad reputation through defection in the
game. In another study, Singer et al. (2004a) allowed
subjects to face a series of cooperative and no-coo-
perative opponents in a sequential PDG. In a
subsequent sex assessment fMRI task, the authors
demonstrated that simply displaying the faces to these
cooperative partners in contrast to neutral faces
revealed activations in reward- and emotion-related
areas such as striatum, amygdala and insula. This
ﬁnding suggests that trustworthy persons’ faces trigger
emotion and reward expectation.
We argue that empathy provides a more precise and
direct estimate of other people’s future actions, since
shared emotional networks also directly elicit the
activation of associated relevant motivational and
action systems (de Vignemont & Singer 2006). Both
players are in a cooperative relationship and one knows
that the other person is the source of one’s own affective
state. By sharing their empathy state, they also share
their emotional and motivational states, enabling them
to make faster and more accurate predictions about the
partner’s future actions.
(b) Speciﬁc networks for trust and reciprocity
Because the psychology of trust is relevant for player 1,
whereas the psychology of reciprocity is important for
player 2, we next explored which brain regions were
only involved in trusting behaviour and not in
reciprocating behaviour and vice versa.
Trusting is always risky given the unpredictability of
theintentionsofthepartnerinasocialexchange(Fehr &
Fischbacher 2003). Decisions to trust compared with
decisionstoreciprocaterevealed activations in the lateral
frontopolar cortex (FPC) and the right temporoparietal
junction (TPJ) (ﬁgure 4b). Accumulating neuroimaging
evidence indicates that the right TPJ plays a critical role
in social cognition such as perspective taking (Ruby &
Decety 2003; Jackson et al.2 0 0 6 b), sense of agency
(Ruby & Decety 2001; Farrer & Frith 2002; Decety &
Sommerville 2003; Farrer et al. 2003), empathy
(Jackson et al. 2006a; Lamm et al.2 0 0 7 )a n d
mentalizing (Saxe & Wexler 2005; Lawrence et al.
2006). However, a recent fMRI study by Mitchell
(2008) demonstrated that the activity in the right TPJ is
not selective for mentalizing. Furthermore, Decety &
Lamm (2007) demonstrated in a recent quantitative
arMFC
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Figure 4. Brain responses. (a) Conjunction analysis. The
anterior rostral medial prefrontal cortex (arMFC; BA 9/32; x,
y, z; 6, 47,22) andthe anterior insula (AI; BA 13;28, 15,K4)
were commonly activated for trusting and reciprocating
behaviour. (b) Trust versus reciprocate. Decisions to trust
compared with decisions to reciprocate activated the bilateral
frontopolar cortex (FPC; BA 10; K18, 62, 10; 30, 59, 7) and
the temporoparietal junction (TPJ; BA 40; 48, K52, 34).
Statistical imageswere superimposed on a template structural
brain in Talairach space and thresholded at p!0.005,
uncorrected, with an extent threshold of 100 mm
3 (tZ3.00,
random effects). A priori regions hypothesized to be active
were tested for activity using a small volume correction of a
sphere of 10 mm and a false discovery rate (FDR) with
a threshold of q(FDR)!0.05 (small volume corrected) and a
cluster size threshold of 100 mm
3.
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domain speciﬁc to social cognition, but rather is a more
lower level computational mechanism involved in
generating, testing and correcting internal predictions
about external sensory events (Blakemore & Frith
2003). We argue that mentalizing depends on the
coordinated interaction of both domain-speciﬁc abilities
represented in the PFC and domain-general abilities
representedintheposteriorcortexsuchasTPJ(Adolphs
2001; Decety & Grezes 2006). The TPJ helps us to
simulate another person’s experience and interpret
their actions within the context of their current choice
which is then decoupled from reality in the medial PFC
to provide an abstract encoding of the intentions of
another person.
The FPC encodes meta-cognitive representations
that enable us to reﬂect on the long-term values linked
to the outcomes of our decisions (Wood & Grafman
2003; Tanaka et al. 2004). A recent meta-analysis of the
functional specialization within the FPC (Brodmann
area 10) revealed a functional variation between lateral
and medial subregions of the FPC (Gilbert et al. 2006).
Mentalizing was more likely to be associated with
activation in the caudal medial FPC, whereas acti-
vation in the lateral FPC supports high-level guidance
of task performance over extended periods of time
(Christoff & Gabrieli 2000). Humans often sacriﬁce
material beneﬁts to endorse or oppose societal causes
based on moral beliefs, which has been the target of
recent experimental economics studies (Moll et al.
2005). Recently, Moll et al. (2006) used fMRI to
investigate charitable donation behaviour while partici-
pants anonymously donated to or opposed real
charitable organizations related to major societal
causes. The authors demonstrated that the more
anterior sectors of the PFC were distinctively recruited
when altruistic choices prevail over selﬁsh material
interests. We argue that to make an exchange, it is
necessary that ﬁrst players overcome the desire for
immediate gratiﬁcation in favour of greater but
postponed gains from mutual cooperation. Based on
such a mechanism, we are able to balance immediate
motives against the long-term consequences of our
choices and long-term beneﬁts in real social
interactions (Wood & Grafman 2003).
In sum, our ﬁndings extend previous knowledge of
the neural basis of trust and reciprocity in two-person
reciprocal exchange. Trusting and reciprocating
behaviour draw upon common neural systems of
mentalizing (arMFC and TPJ) and empathy (AI).
Both mentalizing (cognitive sharing with another
person) and empathy (affective sharing with another
person) involve an ability to simultaneously distinguish
between different possible perspectives during recipro-
cal exchange. In addition, trusting behaviour speci-
ﬁcally recruited an evaluation system for prospective
outcomes (FPC). This more recently evolved system
provides a mechanism that enables individuals to
weight long-term rewards over immediate short-term
gains allowing, therefore, mutual cooperation. The
interplay of these neural systems supports reciprocal
exchange that operates beyond the immediate spheres
of kinship, one of the distinguishing features of the
human species.
5. SUMMARY
In this paper, we reviewed the results from a number of
game experiments that establish a unitary system for
forming subjective expected utility maps in the brain,
and acting on these maps to produce choices. Game
playing in humans involves two major systems: a
valuation-choice system for making trade-offs and a
shared social system for understanding and sharing
mental states. The valuation-choice system has been
the target of numerous studies of both human and non-
human subjects, resulting in a relatively uniﬁed model
of decision making involving a reinforcement learning
system that calculates the expected utility of different
choices, an expected utility map that weights the
relative value of different choices and an all or nothing
competition to make the ﬁnal choice. However, more
work needs to be done to better understand how
neuronal systems learn to construct the underlying
decision problems, and how neuronal systems perform
b a c k w a r da n df o r w a r di n d u c t i o ni nam u l t i s t a g e
decision process such as those made in extensive form
games. For example, it is not clear whether strategies
themselves are choice variables in the brain or whether
strategies are simply stable constructs of the choices
made at decision nodes.
The shared social system has also been the target of
numerous studies, but largely with human subjects.
These studies suggest that human subjects use both
empathy (shared affect) and mentalizing (shared
intentions) to better understand other players in the
game and that neural computations that allow shared
mental states affect the way games are deﬁned in the
brain and, consequently, how experience in games is
encoded. While empathy and mentalizing clearly
affect the valuation-choice system, there does not exist
a biologically plausible computational model of how
this occurs.
Within the existing paradigms of single-cell record-
ing studies in monkeys and neuroimaging studies in
humans, more work needs to be done to develop games
that both monkeys and humans can play. So far, little
has been done along these lines, and the little that has
been done has not controlled for differences in how
monkeys or humans are trained or how they make their
decisions. Yet, this is important to adequately deﬁne,
and study, the homologous brain regions that are
assumed to exist between monkeys and humans.
At the same time, more work needs to be done to
develop better game controls for studying the different
neuronal computations involved in game play. For
example, Cox (2004) has reanalysed the IG using
separate controls for other regarding preferences. He
has found that some decisions typically labelled as
trusting and trustworthy are mislabelled, but are due
instead to subjects’ altruism to their partners. It is also
important to explicitly account for repeated game
strategies by having subjects play ﬁnitely repeated
games with the same partner but be repaired with a new
partner after each sequence.
Furthermore, futuretheory and researchneed to gain
a better understanding of how the dispositions and
behaviours of players affect how they think, feel and
behave in economic games. In addition, research should
explore how and why certain combinations of partner
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preferences (Fehr & Camerer 2007). Nevertheless, for
the social neuroscience and economics to advance, we
must gain a deeper understanding on how social
disorders such as autism, Asperger’s and Williams’
syndrome, social phobias and antisocial personality
disorder are linked to differences in neural activation
during economic exchange. For example, Sally & Hill
(2006) compared the behaviour of healthy with autistic
individuals in the UG and PDG. The authors showed
that autistic individuals were more likely to accept initial
low offers in the UG and had a more difﬁcult time
shifting strategy in the PDG. Moreover, comparing the
behaviour of patients with focal brain lesions with
healthy controls is also an important step in prooﬁng
the prerequisite of various brain regions for particular
game behaviours. For example, Koenigs & Tranel
(2007) employed the UG to investigate decision making
in patients with ventromedial PFC (VMPFC) damage.
The authors demonstrated that the VMPFC group
showedahigher rejection rateforeachofthemostunfair
offers, showingthat the VMPFC is a critical brain region
in normal economic decision making. Moreover,
temporary brain lesions induced by TMS might be
helpful to identify the neural processes involved in
decisions in which standard economic models predict
behaviour (e.g. Knoch et al.2 0 0 6 b).
By working together within the formal construct of
game theory to build experiments to study a positive
theoryof game play, neuroscientists and economists are
beginning to develop new insights that beneﬁt both
disciplines (Sanfey 2007). One beneﬁt for economists
is that expected utility, the fundamental underpinning
of game theory, is operating as observable phenomena
in neurons. As a consequence, deviations from
maximizing behaviour may not be due to failures of
expected utility, but may more likely be due to how
subjects construct their understanding of the game
through both their own and their shared mental
experience. A beneﬁt for neuroscientists is the math-
ematical formalism that the theory of games puts on
social decision making. In particular, this leads to the
understanding that social strategies are not just
functions of a single brain’s computation, but also a
function of extrinsic equilibrium conditions, which
produce external computations, which end up shaping
how the brain decides.
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